56M Perini S/Y Bayesian Sinks During Palermo Storm

When a poster demonstrates they are an AZZHOLE, such as you did with the "STFU", it is incumbent upon someone to affirm your COMPLETE & TOTAL IGNORANCE, and RUDENESS.
By your own statements, it is apparent YOU DON'T KNOW JACK. And since that is true, perhaps you should take your own advice and STFU!!
1) A 500DW ton vessel will not have 200T of ballast.
2) From the stability booklet of the vessel, it has 45.3 tons of fixed ballast & 52 ton swing keel.

You might want to exhibit some humility. There are plenty of knowledgable folks on this forum; but as you demonstrated, a few holes too.

The stills in that video show this WT door/vertical hatch on the port side of the mast, do you know if there is something similar on stbd?

The reported bow-down orientation as the event unfolded may be due to fore-aft asymmetry in the hull lines; when the vessel is heeled CB moves aft causing bow down trim. You see this quite clearly on many smaller modern production yachts usually as they're beating to windward.

Thank you, that's fantastic. Is this available as a pdf anywhere?

It’s a forum for conversation, sharing, and even education. The tough-person act should be checked at the door.

Another video but a good, dense presentation of the known facts leading to the sinking.

@Pascal it's a bit frustrating really, as all the interesting bits, i.e. sailing & wind heeling calcs, are understandably carried out with the board down.

Qualitatively, the +/-3m vertical shift of 52t due to board position, leading to the values shown in the first figure 'Motoring Conditions Limits - Centreboard Up', indicate stability characteristics (esp. when lightly loaded) not far off many motor vessels... which don't carry large masts for obvious reasons. And then flooding begins ~40° of heel.

'Compliance with the stability criteria does not ensure immunity against capsize or absolve the Master from his responsibilities.'

Clearly we don’t have enough information to cast blame to the captain at this point. Questions critical rest between occurrences between midnight directives and the crew on deck scrambling at 20 degree heel. What happened during this time period that led to possible flooding, power loss, anchor dragging, no main engines firing, and 15 in the water.

That mast is itself a significant sail. But the power appears to be lost before any knockdowns. Odd. Possibly just a calamity of critical events.

Apologies if my post led you to infer that I was. Quite the opposite, I strongly doubt that he had any idea just how marginal the stability actually was with board up.

If the excerpts posted from the stability booklet are the most relevant parts and are typical of the remainder, there's nothing in there that would indicate concern or unusual precautions to be taken whilst at anchor, even with dirty weather on the way.

Add to that 16 years of 'safe' operation, probably following all the same protocols, and I'd think it would be very difficult to cast blame on him.

No apology required. I was merely summarizing where I thought the subject stood.

I tend to take advantage of these mishaps to learn and challenge myself to my own preparations or reactions. I really believe in the 10,000 repetition rule, so it makes sense to try to put yourself into the shoes here, to learn and to challenge yourself.

I look forward to more information being disclosed, to better understand and fill in the blanks.

Nah, this dude is not a YouTuber but the editor of Practical Sailor magazine and he was talking about riding out a hurricane at anchor and admitted it was not a smart move.
I don’t have stock in Practical Sailor, but I did follow them the 20 years I was sailboat owner/sailor.

From a poster on a ocean-going commercial forum:

Me thinks, Free Surface Effect might have played a role. Water does not have to make it below deck to serriously effect stability if it gets trapped on deck. If the deck or cockpit is unable to shed water fast enough.
A bit of this a bit of that it all adds up. To in this case a catastrophic problem which was not contemplated by the applicable codes, design builder or operator. Ultimately the crew present on the day.
Quite honestly I don’t think I would have been prepared for this. A ship at anchor. A thunderstorm. No I wouldn’t have anticipated this. Or been prepared for it.

Initial approach, Appears to have been noticed. By Watch, By crew, Including Master Mates Engineer and some Pax or guests.
The crew were responding to a mess created by a storm. Which brought them up on deck, Some Pax must have been concerned enough to come up on deck or been on deck for some other reason.
This saved their lives. Some were probability injured by falling a significant distance, when the deck suddenly became a bulkhead. Or the fell OB.
The people bellow deck appear to have been guests. Possibly awakened, Possibly asleep. ietherway not concerned enough. Why not? They are on a big safe ship, They have people to deal with this.
They would have possibly been suddenly thrown or fallen to the low side. possible quite a few meters enough to injure. Disorientated. The Deck is now a bulkhead. You have to climb to the exit if you can even find it. It may have gone dark.
What was the required EM lighting, signage ect?

Look at reports for other other vessels which suffered a sudden catastrophic loss of stability.
Princes Victoria.
Herald of Free Enterprise.
Estonia.
The Sewol.
There was no effective response.
On deck you had a chance.
Bellow deck,
The Herald Didn’t completely capsize or sink. Some got out.
The Others not so much.

The Storm winds arrived.
The wind direction and speed increased dramatically.
The ship heeled to the wind.
The Ship started dragging her anchor.
The anchor dragged very quickly or cable parted.
Bow fell off down wind.
If the anchor had kept her “Head to wind”? She might have had a chance. Beam on?
The “out burst” or “down burst” on the beam wasn’t just a coincidence.

Wind keep increasing and as she turned down wind heel got much worse.
Force on mast should get less a ship heels.
Unfortunately its a down burst. Force on mast still increasing as ship heels.
Somewhere in this deck edge immersion occurs.
Water on deck, Water Ingress Begines Water Down Bellow.
The water goes to the low side. making things worse
When did she go to 20? 40? 80? 90?
From upright to 20 ish. Appears to have been some time, as crew responded trying to deal with blowing stuff on deck.
Very quickly from 20 on
Prior to 20. It’s a Sailing vessel. “Crew guests, We are not alarmed”. Yet. “Or some of us are just getting there”.
Suddenly an unexpectedly she goes way past 20.
40 and its going bad fast. and getting worse.
50 ish. The power to resist is getting less and water is making it worse.
By 80 its gone.
Once she gets to 80 or 90 the water is coming in quickly through all the exits. holding closed hatches shut and pouring into open hatches.
She past the point of recovery. even as the wind eases changes and switches the other way. The ship is doomed.
The liferaft hydrostatic release activates.
The people in the water are able to find some floatation jackets the raft.
It’s now a rescue and recovery.

A video of a knock down in Australia. . . Big boat laid flat, but returns. . .

Ship floor plans suggest the stairwell exists leading up to that doghouse enclosure. Starboard side of the mast is a companionway leading to guest quarters. Crew access is that port stair as well as ladders to deck hatches forward.

Not sure if this was mentioned earlier in the thread, but with regards to a muster drill, or atleast a basic familiarization of the evacuation routes and location of life jackets etc. I assume this is not a requirement in the yachting world, or if it is, its not practiced. As a class surveyor, I know that on passenger ferries, a safety video is shown before departure outlining these things. Also when joining a commercial vessel, new crew, or visitors staying onboard are given a brief induction of the location of emergency exits and your life boat location etc. I wonder if this question would be raised in this investigation, and flag and class of these larger yachts may enforce stricter requirements for both private and charter yachts above a certain size, or guest capacity.

Don't recall, but wasn't the report that the keel was partially deployed? Drawing is interesting, but it doesn't really tell the story of weight distribution on the retractable keel. Given the design of the mechanics, I would assume the ballast is relatively evenly distributed. I've seen devices more like centerboards with vertical retraction wherein a ballast bulb is at the base of the moving panel.

Also, given the report by the one surviving passenger with the child, she describes essentially being "launched" or "directly delivered" into the water. One minute she's asleep, and the next minute she's in the water with her child. Suggests the layover happened severely and quickly.

My head goes back to lights disappearing while she was still living in the 10-20 degree angle, pre-layover. Something is still missing.